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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

ROGER L. STRADER,
Defendant/Appellant.

: Case No. 940244-CA
Priority No. 2
:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1994).

STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 (1990) provides:
76-1-401• "Single criminal episode" defined -- Joinder
of offenses and defendants.
In this part unless the context requires a
different definition, "single criminal episode" means
all conduct which is closely related in time and is
incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single
criminal objective.
Nothing in this part shall be construed to limit
or modify the effect of Section 77-21-31 in controlling
the joinder of offenses and defendants in criminal
proceedings.
Emphasis added.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1990) provides:
76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single
criminal episode - Included offenses.
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single
criminal action for all separate offenses arising out
of a single criminal episode; however, when the same
act of a defendant under a single criminal episode
shall establish offenses which may be punished in
different ways under different provisions of this code,

the act shall be punishable under only one such
provision; an acquittal or conviction and sentence
under any such provision bars a prosecution under any
other such provision.
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate
offenses under a single criminal episode, unless the
court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant
shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple
offenses when:
Ca) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of
a single court, and
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting
attorney at the time the defendant is arraigned on
the first information or indictment,
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense
included in the offense charged but may not be
convicted of both the offense charged and the included
offense. An offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or
less than all the facts required to establish the
commission of the offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation,
conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit the
offense charged or an offense otherwise included
therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute
as a lesser included offense.
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge
the jury with respect to an included offense unless
there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of
the included offense.
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict
or judgment, or an appellate court on appeal or
certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient
evidence to support a conviction for the offense
charged but that there is sufficient evidence to
support a conviction for an included offense and the
trier of fact necessarily found every fact required for
conviction of that included offense, the verdict or
judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and
a judgment of conviction entered for the included
offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such
relief is sought by the defendant.
Emphasis added.
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403 (1990) provides:
76-1-403. Former prosecution barring subsequent
prosecution for offense out of same episode.
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or
more offenses arising out of a single criminal episode,
a subsequent prosecution for the same or a different
offense arising out of the same criminal episode is
barred if:
(a) The subseguent prosecution is for an
offense that was or should have been tried under
Subsection 76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution;
and
(b) The former prosecution;
(i) resulted in acquittal; or
(ii) resulted in conviction; or
(iii) was improperly terminated; or
(iv) was terminated by a final order or
judgment for the defendant that has not been
reversed, set aside, or vacated and that
necessarily required a determination inconsistent
with a fact that must be established to secure
conviction in the subsequent prosecution.
(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution
resulted in a finding of not guilty by the trier of
facts or in a determination that there was insufficient
evidence to warrant conviction. A finding of guilty of
a lesser included offense is an acquittal of the
greater offense even though the conviction for the
lesser included offense is subsequently reversed, set
aside, or vacated.
(3) There is a conviction if the prosecution
resulted in a judgment of guilt that has not been
reversed, set aside, or vacated; a verdict of guilty
that has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated and
that is capable of supporting a judgment; or a plea of
guilty accepted by the court.
(4) There is an improper termination of
prosecution if the termination takes place before the
verdict, is for reasons not amounting to an acquittal,
and takes place after a jury has been impanelled and
sworn to try the defendant, or, if the jury trial is
waived, after the first witness is sworn. However,
termination of prosecution is not improper if:
(a) The defendant consents to the termination;
or
(b) The defendant waives his right to object to
the termination;
(c) The court finds and states for the record
that the termination is necessary because:
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(i) It is physically impossible to proceed
with the trial in conformity with the law; or
(ii) There is a legal defect in the
proceeding not attributable to the state that
would make any judgment entered upon a verdict
reversible as a matter of law; or
(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the
courtroom not attributable to the state makes it
impossible to proceed with the trial without
injustice to the defendant or the state; or
(iv) The jury is unable to agree upon a
verdict; or
(v) False statements of a juror on voir dire
prevent a fair trial.
Emphasis added.

Rule 9.5, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides:
Rule 9.5. Charged multiple offenses - To be filed in
single court.
(1)
(a) Unless otherwise provided by law,
complaints, citations, or informations charging
multiple offenses, which may include violations
of state laws, county ordinances, or municipal
ordinances and arising from a single criminal
episode as defined by Section 76-1-401, shall
be filed in a single court that has
jurisdiction of the charged offense with the
highest possible penalty of all the offenses
charged.
(b) The offenses within the complaint,
citation, or information may not be separated
except by order of the court and for good cause
shown.
(2) For purposes of this section, the court that
is adjudicating the complaint, citation, or information
has jurisdiction over all the offenses charged, and a
single prosecutorial entity shall prosecute the
offenses.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred in refusing to

dismiss the remaining charges when defendant had previously pled

4

guilty to one of the charges arising out of the same criminal
episode?
Standard of review.

Questions of statutory

interpretation present questions of law reviewed for correctness.
Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990).

The

underlying facts here are undisputed.
Preserved below by pretrial "Motion to Dismiss
Information," R. 31-3 (see hearing transcript, R. 76-127), and by
conditional guilty plea reserving this issue, R. 41-47 (statement
of defendant) at 41; R. 59 (Final Order).

REASONS SUPPORTING ARGUMENT AND WRITTEN
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Appellant respectfully requests oral argument.

This is

an issue of first impression in Utah, as there is presently no
Utah case law construing Rule 9.5.

Additionally, there is

continued confusion in the trial courts as to the applicability
of Coolev and Sosa.

The district courts now have proper

jurisdiction over all offenses arising out of a single criminal
episode, yet the State continues to rely on these cases for the
proposition that, despite the clear mandate of rule 9.5 and § 761-402(2),

lesser offenses that fall within the limited

jurisdiction of inferior courts may be prosecuted even when
greater offenses arise out of the same criminal episode.

A

published decision would assist the bench and bar with future
cases that will involve this recurring issue.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
On July 22, 1992 Mr. Strader was charged in Third
Circuit Court in West Valley City with giving false information
to a police officer in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-507
(1990).

See Citation, Defendant's Exhibit 1 (received at R. 81)

(attached as addendum A ) .

On September 3, 1992 Mr. Strader pled

guilty to this charge and was sentenced.

See WVC Docket No.

921002665MC, Defendant's Exhibit 2 (received at R. 82) (attached
as addendum B ) .
On October 19, 1992, the information in the present
case was filed, charging Mr. Strader with the same count of false
information to a police officer and additional counts of Class A
theft (§76-6-404) and 3rd degree possession of a controlled
substance (§58-37-8 (2) (a) (i)) . R. 3 (docket), 11-13

(information

dated 10/7/92).
Mr. Strader filed a motion to dismiss the information,
R. 31-3 3, which was heard on November 22, 1993.
R. 76-127.

See transcript,

The trial court dismissed the duplicative false

information charge,1 but refused to dismiss the remaining two
charges, finding that the false information was not part of a
single criminal episode with either of the other two charges.

R.

119-24 (statements from the bench), R. 34 (minute entry granting
motion to dismiss only as to the false information charge), R.

x

In fact, the false information charge was not bound over at
the September 7, 1993 preliminary hearing.
R. 5-6.
The trial
court's duplicative dismissal is harmless.
6

51-57 (Findings, Conclusions, and Order) (attached as addendum
C) .
Mr. Strader pled conditionally guilty to count III,
possession of a controlled substance, a 3rd degree felony.
41-47 (statement of defendant), 59 (final order).

R.

The court

stayed the statutory prison sentence pending satisfactory
completion of probation.

R. 60-61.

probation was stayed pending appeal.

The one year jail term of
R. 61.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The trial court entered detailed and accurate findings
of fact.2

See R. 51-53 (attached as addendum C ) .

undisputed.

The facts are

The following recitation of facts roughly parallels

the courts findings, but contains slightly greater detail and
record cites to evidence presented at the hearing.
On July 21st, 1992 officer Jerry Randall of the West
Valley Police was on duty and arrested Mr. Strader for the
instant charges.

R. 83.

As described by Officer Randall:

Yeah, I observed what I thought might be a
theft. As I was parked across the street in a parking
lot I saw a car pull up, man get out [and] go into the
construction site, carry something back out. He put
that inside. That's when I moved forward to stop the
vehicle.
R. 87.

This occurred at approximately 11 P.M.

R. 88.

Officer

Randall, in his marked police car, made a traffic stop of Mr.
2

The only minor inaccuracy is that the court indicated that
Mr. Strader's initial plea was withdrawn on May 23, 1993, when the
correct date appears to be May 25, 1993. Compare R. 53 1[l0 with R.
5 (docket) . This error is irrelevant to the merits of this appeal.
7

Strader and asked him for identification.

R. 92.

Mr. Strader

produced no ID, but gave the officer the name "Stanley Kent
Strader with a date of birth of 3-1-53."

R. 92-93.

The officer

identified the object in the back of the car as a circular saw.3
Mr. Strader indicated that he had picked the saw up for a friend.
R. 93.
A female in the car said she could get Mr. Strader's
identification because they lived in the apartment complex there.
R. 93-94.

A man returned with a wallet with a driver license

with the name Earl S. Nesbitt and a photograph that "appeared to
be Mr. Strader but it was not very identifiable.
altered."

Had been

R. 94.
Officer Randall determined that he had been given false

information and decided to place Mr. Strader under arrest.

He

was removed from the vehicle, handcuffed, and placed in the
officer's car.

A check on the license plate on the vehicle

revealed that it did not belong to that vehicle.

R. 95.

Officer

Randall impounded the vehicle and found a loaded syringe4 and
other syringes during an inventory search.

R. 96-7.

Mr. Strader

later admitted that Stanley is his brother, and that the used
syringe found in the seat belonged to him.

R. 98-9

Mr. Strader was booked on three charges:

false

information, theft, and possession of a controlled substance.

R.

3

Further investigation by Officer Black revealed that the saw
belonged to a Carl Tippetts. R. 97.
laboratory analysis revealed the presence of methamphetamine.
8

84, 87, 99.

See also Exhibit 1 (back of citation reads "The

person gave me the name of Stanly [sic] Strader.

He was book

[sic] for this and theft and poss. of Drugs"); R. 84 (officer
admits writing this on the back of the citation).
As set forth above, see Statement of the Case and
Nature of the Proceedings, Mr. Strader was charged in third
circuit court, West Valley division with giving false information
to a police officer and pled guilty.
later brought in district court.

The instant charges were

The trial court declined to

dismiss the information, a conditional plea was entered, and this
appeal ensued.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Mr. Strader's offenses all arise out of a single criminal
episode.

The offenses occurred at the same time, with the single

criminal objective of stealing a circular saw and avoiding getting
caught for that offense or any others.

Under Rule 9.5 and Utah

Code Ann. § 76-1-402(2), all offenses against Mr. Strader should
have been brought together in the district court.
Before the instant charges were brought, Mr. Strader pled
guilty to the false information charge which arose out of this
episode.

Under Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403(1), that conviction bars

any further prosecution for the offenses charged in this action.
This Court should vacate the conviction and sentence, and remand
with instructions that the information be dismissed with prejudice.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE DISMISSED THE
INFORMATION BECAUSE MR. STRADER HAD ALREADY
PLED TO A CHARGE ARISING FROM THE SAME
CRIMINAL EPISODE.
A.

MR. STRADER7 S OFFENSES ARE PART OF A
SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE AS DEFINED IN
§ 76-1-401.

The trial court based its decision to deny Mr. Strader's
motion to dismiss primarily on its determination that the false
information charge was not part of a single criminal episode with
either or both of the theft and drug possession charges. The trial
court stated:
Now, the issue is: Does it then have a bar to
subsequent prosecution? If I find there was in fact a
single criminal episode in this matter, then that would
bar the subsequent offense via the information that is
filed in this matter. It is my finding that there was
not a single criminal episode in this case. There was
not a common objective of all the different offenses
involved here.
R. 121.

See also R. 53 M 3 - 4 .
Section 76-1-401 defines single criminal episode as "all

conduct which is closely related in time and is incident to an
attempt

or an accomplishment

of a single criminal objective."

There is no question that the offenses here were closely related in
time.

The stop was made immediately after Mr. Strader was seen

leaving the construction site, Mr. Strader gave a false name and
birth date immediately upon being asked for identification, and the
controlled substances were found during a search incident to arrest
and vehicle

inventory search.

The issue here

10

is whether

the

criminal objective of giving the false information is the same as
that for either or both of the other offenses.

1.

Mr. Strader's Objective in Giving
False Information was to Avoid Being
Caught for the Other Offenses.

With respect to the objective of the false information
given by Mr. Strader, the trial court stated:
I believe the difference was the difference in
criminal objective. You have a theft which is objective
as to taking, permanently deprive. If that be the case,
whatever, an objecti[ve] of taking drugs has no
indication or no nexus to the fact that he gave false
information to a police officer. His identity for the
purpose and the objective of giving false information to
a police officer was not to reveal his name.
For
whatever reason, that is not before me at this time.
There has been some speculation that the reason
he said that is to prevent from being discovered on all
the other criminal conduct, i.e. possession of the
controlled substance as well as theft case, but then that
is just speculative before me. There is no indication to
indicate that before me at all.
R. 123.
The trial court takes too narrow a view of the concept of
single criminal objective.

In State v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 3 9 (Utah

App. 1990) defendant was charged with second degree murder and
child abuse, stemming from an incident where he stabbed his live-in
girlfriend to death and choked her seven year old son with a vacuum
cleaner cord.5

Lopez argued the charges should have been severed.

This court found that joinder in the first instance was proper, as
the charges arose from a single criminal episode:

5

The homicide victim's son survived
'resiliency of youth.' " Id. at 42.
11

"only because

of

the

In the present case, appellant killed Cindy
and, only minutes later, attempted to strangle Roberto.
The evidence indicates that appellant's purpose in
attempting to strangle Roberto was to keep Roberto from
telling others that he had killed Cindy.
These two
events were closely related in time and incident to the
accomplishment of a single criminal objective, namely to
kill Cindy and avoid being caught, so as to be part of a
single criminal episode.
Lopez, 789 P.2d at 42.
The facts here are directly analogous.

Mr. Strader had

just been seen leaving a construction site after hours with a
circular saw.
later,
His

Upon being stopped by a police officer a minute

Mr. Strader gave his brother's name rather than his own.

only

possible

purpose

for

doing

so would

be

to

deflect

attention from himself and get away with the crime he had just
committed, and avoid detection of the controlled substances in his
automobile.
A police
revealed

his prior

computer
criminal

check

on his own name would

history, heightened

the

have

officer's

suspicion, and in all likelihood protracted the duration of the
police encounter.

Mr. Strader was aware of the saw he had just

taken, as well as at least one syringe located in the automobile.
He wanted the police encounter to end as abruptly as possible, and
towards that end gave the officer his brother's name, R. 98.
In Lopez, this Court declined to take such a narrow view
of single criminal objective.

It could have said the objective of

killing the mother was to cause her death, and the objective of
strangling her child was the separate objective of attempting to
cause his death.

Instead, this Court took a common sense look at
12

the totality of the circumstances to determine what the criminal
objective was. Committing an offense and immediate attempts to get
away with that offense constitute but a single criminal objective.
The trial court's determination here is too simplistic.
Its determination that "the purpose and objective of giving false
information to a police officer was not to reveal his name," R.
122-3, misses the forest for the trees.

Digging a little deeper,

the objective on not revealing his name is to avoid being caught
for the theft and controlled substance violations.
Other case law is in accord.
P.2d

1135

(Utah

1989),

defendant

In State v. Johnson, 784

made

a

phone

call

to

his

girlfriend's roommate "a few hours" before an officer was shot. He
was upset because his girlfriend was seeing another man. Defendant
threatened
to beat up his girlfriend's suitor, tear off his legs,
and blow off his head and threatened he might blow up his
girlfriend's apartment building. As defendant spoke, he
repeatedly loaded and unloaded a gun. He claimed to have
a rifle with a scope, a .357 magnum, and a sawed-off
shotgun in his possession.
. . .
It would not be
unreasonable for the jury to infer that defendant was
highly agitated on the night in question and intended to
shoot anyone -- including an officer -- who frustrated
his activity.
Johnson, 784 P. 2d at 1138.

The Supreme Court found that the phone

call and the officer shooting a few hours later were part of a
single criminal episode.

" [T]he phone call was the beginning of a

string of events all closely related in time that ended with the
shooting of Trooper Bringhurst.

As such, the phone call was part

of a single criminal episode."

Id. at 1141

(footnote cite to

§ 76-1-401 definition of single criminal episode omitted).
13

In Johnson, the Supreme Court declined to view criminal
objective narrowly.

It could have found the purpose of the phone

call was to threaten his girlfriend's roommate or to vent his rage,
while the purpose of firing the shotgun at the officer was to cause
him grievous bodily harm.

Instead, the Supreme Court looked at the

totality of the circumstances and determined that the objective of
Johnson's conduct over several hours was to injure his girlfriend's
new suitor and anyone else who might happen to get in his way.
In State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50 (Utah 1993), defendant
was charged with second degree murder, robbery, and forgery.

The

Utah Supreme Court found that all three offenses were part of the
same criminal episode:
First, the forgery occurred almost immediately after the
robbery and homicide and hence was closely related in
time.
The fact that Germonto spent some time making
several attempts to cash the forged check does not
destroy the temporal proximity of the forgery to the
other crimes. Second, the record supports a finding that
the offenses shared a single objective, namely to obtain
property of value from [the victim].
Germonto, 86 8 P. 2d at 59.

The Supreme Court looked at the broader

picture and found that all offenses, including the homicide, had an
objective of obtaining property of value from the victim.
In State in re R.D.S., 777 P. 2d 532, 538
1989), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383

(Utah App.

(Utah 1990) this Court found

that a juvenile's actions in child kidnapping, aggravated sexual
abuse, and homicide of a six year old girl constituted a single
criminal

episode.

This

Court

found

that

seeking

sexual

gratification and avoiding detection for such actions constituted
but a single objective.
14

In State v. McGrath, 749 P.2d 631, 633 (Utah 1988), the
Supreme

Court

found

that

eight

incidents

of

trafficking

in

controlled substances over a seven week period constituted but a
single criminal episode.

Viewed narrowly, each transaction could

be seen as having a separate objective of selling a specified
quantity of drugs for an agreed sum, but properly viewed under
§ 76-1-401, the entire series of transactions must be viewed as
having but a single criminal objective.
In light of this controlling authority, Mr. Strader's
offenses here constitute a single criminal episode.

The trial

court erred in concluding otherwise.

2.

The Inclusion of All Three Charges
in One Information Here Indicates
that the Prosecution Considers them
to be Part of a Single Criminal
Episode.

The trial court's legal conclusions contain a glaring
inconsistency.

The trial court stated from the bench:

The examination of 76-1-402, 76-1-403 as well as Rule
9.5, it is the opinion of the court that Rule 9.5 says
distinctly what the state attempted to do in this matter.
If you are going to charge someone with a crime you
charge them with the higher crime, and the court with its
jurisdiction to do that they have alleged in their
information, three counts[:] possession of a controlled
substance, a felony; a false information to a p [ea]ce
officer, Class C Misdemeanor; and the theft, a Class A
Misdemeanor.
R. 120.

This same conclusion is contained in the court's written

conclusions:
crimes was
Procedure."

"The County Attorney's Office by charging all three
following

rule

9.5

of

R. 53 Hi.
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the Utah Rules

of

Criminal

Rule
involving

9.5,

by

its terms, only

applies

to

situations

two or more offenses arising from a single

episode.

The

county

attorney's

office,

by

filing

criminal

all

three

offenses in a single information, made a tacit admission that these
offenses arise from a single criminal episode.

The trial court so

recognized.

attorney's

Having

found

that

the

county

office

properly followed the mandate of rule 9.5, and the charges thus
arise from a single criminal episode, the trial court inexplicably
goes on to find that Mr. Strader is not entitled to the benefit of
§§

76-1-402(2)

and

76-1-403(1),

which

preclude

multiple

prosecutions when offenses arise from a single criminal episode.
The court cannot have it both ways.
Mr.
episode.

Strader's

offenses

arise

from a single

criminal

His motion to dismiss this second prosecution should have

been granted.

B.

RULE 9.5, § 76-1-402(2), AND § 76-1403(1) BAR
THE PROSECUTION
OF
THE
ADDITIONAL OFFENSES AFTER MR. STRADER
PLED GUILTY TO THE FALSE INFORMATION
CHARGE.

Rule 9.5 requires that offenses arising from a single
criminal episode be brought in a single information filed in the
court with jurisdiction over the most serious offense.

Rule 9.5

derives from § 77-35-9.5, enacted by laws of 1989, chapter 157, §8.
To date, there is no case law construing this rule.

Nevertheless,

the language of the rule is clear and susceptible of only one
interpretation.

" 'Unambiguous language in [a] statute may not be
16

interpreted to contradict its plain meaning.'"

State v. A House

and 1.3 7 Acres of Real Property, No. 930481, slip op. at 5 (Utah
1994) (quoting Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 500 (Utah 1989) (per
curiam)).

The three offenses should have been charged in a single

information, without prior prosecution of any individual charge in
a different case.
Section 76-1-402(2) is to the same effect.

It provides

that offenses arising out of a single criminal episode must be
brought in a single action if

(a) the offenses are within the

jurisdiction of a single court, and (b) the offenses are known to
the prosecuting attorney at the time the defendant is arraigned on
the first information or indictment.

Subsection (b) is easily met

here -- the false information citation has inscribed on its back
that Mr. Strader was booked for that charge, theft, and possession
of a controlled substance.

See Exhibit 1 (addendum 1, p. 2 ) .

Under current law, subsection (a) is always met: district
courts in Utah have jurisdiction over all felonies, misdemeanors,
and infractions.

Utah Const, art. VIII, § 5; Utah Code Ann. § 78-

3-4(1) (Supp. 1994) . This has not always been the case.

See State

v. Coolev, 575 P. 2d 693 (Utah 1978) (because misdemeanors had to be
tried in justice or city courts, single criminal episode statutes
were not applicable); State v. Sosa, 598 P.2d 342
(same).

As

a

result

of

statutory

changes,

these

(Utah 1979)
cases

are

inapplicable here. Despite their inapplicability, the State argued
this line of cases in the trial court.

R. 113, 116.

These cases

appear to be causing continuing confusion in the trial courts.
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Here, the trial court seemed preoccupied with the jurisdictional
limits of the West Valley City prosecutor's office, see R. 53 ^2
(conclusions of law) and R. 119-121, despite its irrelevance.

The

only issue is whether there is a single court that has jurisdiction
over all the offenses, and the district court clearly does.

This

Court should clarify that district courts now have jurisdiction
over all offenses, and Cooley and Sosa may not be relied on to show
the contrary.
Despite the clear mandate of Rule 9.5 and § 76-1-402(2),
Mr. Strader was subjected to multiple prosecutions for offenses
arising from the same criminal episode. Section 76-1-403(1) (b) (ii)
provides that a prior conviction for one offense arising out of a
single criminal episode bars all further prosecutions for other
offenses that may have arisen from that same criminal episode.

The

plain language of this statute requires that the information here
be dismissed.
In State v. Bair, 671 P.2d 203 (Utah 1983), the Supreme
Court held that a defendant acquitted of theft and retaining a
stolen firearm could not be prosecuted in a separate action for
retaining other firearms found at the same time as the firearm
which led to the acquittal.

The same result must pertain here.

The information must be dismissed.

CONCLUSION
The offenses charged here arise out of a single criminal
episode which includes Mr. Strader's false information offense.
18

His conviction for that offense bars further prosecution here.
Appellant respectfully requests that his conviction and sentence be
vacated, with instructions that the information be dismissed with
prejudice.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this A?-fcC day of December, 1994.

ROBERT K. HEINEMAN
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

DAVID P. S. MACK
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, Robert K. Heineman, hereby certify that I have caused
eight copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court of
Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84102, and four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236
State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this
December, 1994.

,

f*?H*

day of

j

Robert K. Meineman

DELIVERED/MAILED this

day of December, 1994.
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ADDENDUM A
False information citation, defense exhibit 1.
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CITY OF WEST VALLEY CITY
THE DEFENDANT IS HEREBY
GIVEN NOTICE TO APPEAR IN

0/lv«f liC«AM NO

O THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT
3636 S CONSTITUTION 8LVO (2/00 W )
WEST VALLEY CITY. UTAH 64H9
601 533 7694

'ktwa 10

iVMiicyColor

I Wihlcta Y«u\ Vfehfcte M>U

!£>jffiyy^ p
f^P*

w%

|Modd'

MttU

Cut

THE ABOVE NAMED OEFENOANT IS CHARGED WITH VIOL ATI NO:

MCIfinOUFflTUAQSflAYS
NOA*©wGermwTVoAYs

uricoicr I

V„. 70. A ti&

RV

COURT HOURS
MONOAY THROUGH FRIDAY
6 00AM TO 6 00 PM

yC-St&X

X

(CLOSEO SATURDAYS SUNOAYS 4 HOLIDAYS)
- Q 3«aDISTRICT JUVENILE COURT

3522^§UJLH WMSL,

I

? 3 ^

REN NOTIFIED BYTHFOeURT

7-2'

.

J

!
QLO
USE

PLEA/FINDING
Q Gullly
n

No Contact

Q

NolQuilly

Q Fo/lei led BaU

W

I CERTIFY THAT COPY OF THIS CITATION OR INFORMATION WAS DULY SERVED UPON THE
DEFENDANT ACCORDING TO LAW ON THE ABOVE DATE ANO I KNOW OR fiEllEVE ANO SO
ALLEGE THAT THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT DID COMMIT THE OFFENSE HEREIN SET
FORTH CONTRARY TO LAW I FURTHER CERTIFY THAT THE COURT TO WHICH THE DEFENDANT
HAS BEEN OIRECTEO TOAl&eXR 18 THE EflOPtfl COURT PURSUANT TO SECTION 77719

6USPENOEO _J

T"

.

.&J&B&

Spfding

I loitratata •
DkKtlon
I (3 Y M Q No N 8 E
MPHOvar

SIGNATURE J

DATE Of CONVICTION/FORFEITURE

!jAIL

• Po«i No.

3?<Wh/

WITHOUT ADMITTING. GUILT. I PRO0J£ETOAPPEARAS OlRCCTEIUlEREIN

FOR COURT USE ONLY

FINE

X

SUSPENOEO
SEVERITY

,

^ y ^

11 Minimum
f l JniarmedJala

<<j7

.._££2L

COMPLAINANT

( 1 Maximum

OL-

DATE

"...

COURT copy i

. . . . . . 19
Out Sam uDiO

RIGHT INDEX

DEFENDANT'S
EXHIBIT,.,

f^L

Til*

UGHT CONDITIONS

ROAOCONOITIONS
owv

WET

SNOW

ICE . POO

D D D D, D

DAY-

DUSK

:Q;

OAWC

O D D
PASSENGERS.

TRAFFIC CONOJTIONS

-UGHT Q JUVENILE

; "OOSJwQ

AOOACSS WHEKE VIOLATOR W A S STOPPE01

_
UCHTfO

MOOERATE

^ S ^ . •

HEAVY Q

NONE I

1 MOW M A N Y *

INFORMA-nnN3.EGALGUAR0IAN

PARENTS NAME

FATHER NOTIFIED

•i

ADDRESS

Q;

MOTHER NOTIFIED

DEFENOA^SCOMMEHTS.Q^u,

•EXClTEO

QsELUGERENT

Q S S . N ^ Q

,NJ

OFFICERS COMMENTS

7 ^

^

^»**w

•"*<«-

^ ^

MARK VIOLATORS CAR WITH
LETTER-A-

^ED

?w5ii^

•JSUP]

OCCURRENCE DATE;•

-I:

TIME Of O C C U R . : ^ ? 5 ' & &

7 - ^ / - ^ 2 L . I H B O

7-<g /- <*£.

REPORT DATE:

TH«U
DAY OF WEEK:

TIME OF REPORT: ? 3 3 &

BUSINESS NAME:
CASE LOCATION: £ 3 <70S.
LOC TYPE:

| / 3

CTY/ST. ^

? W ^

SEAT:

1 /f****/***^

OEPT.CLASS: [ ^ 7

N

1

/ =

\^-n>C^

CASE STATUS: [^2,/

\g,<r/~

/'/-

RELATED CASE NUMBERS:

*7 £
]]||

UCR CLASSIFICATION:

2 ^

REPORT QFCID

<*ZSS>"SJL-

~ / £-

^

[ 27?Y

/

^

GANG RELATED:

[ OCCUPIED

|

2~

STATUTC/CrO:/^,^.

| UNOCCUPIED

|

^si|||ii|j

•

^

COMPL

•

VICTIM
FIRST-

S^^CL^/k.

—*.

t~"

m

ETHNIC ORIGIN:

MiOOLE-

PHONE #:<

)

^£^~-J/*?
AGE:

FEMALE

^ y , ^

•

•

?~

2C

WEIGHT:/^

NON-HISPANIC

O

•

$*$r-6£f-^>

EYE COLOR: J^*

VICTIM

?*?

t

MISD.I

\ I SUSP/ARR

| P < | YES Q ] NO

MlS0.[>4-

FgL

- 1

| FEL. 1

I I MISSPERS

FWST-

NAME: LAST-

WTTNESS

TO

•

I COUNTS: /
1

COUNTS:

WITNESS

MI00LEAPARTMENT:

ADORESS:
STATE:

ZIPy
S.S.N:

EMPLOYER / SCHOOL:
PHONE #:<
| MALE

C

ETHNIC OPIGIN:

1 j HISPANIC

DESCRIPTION:

\ / \

BUS #: (
AGE:

] FEMALE

RACE:

1

>72^-

CTEO:

COMPL

•

T0

*-£/-<
STATUTE:

•

(IF YES. 0 0 SUPP.)

TO .

HEIGHT: v5^ 7

UCR ARREST CHARGE:

P€R:||||g|l

NO

BUS #:

HA*R COLOR. ^ ~

S £^4**^3

|

[ NO

? - *r • 5^y
-

state:

UCR ARREST CHARGE:

SEX:

|YES |

JT£?
23P: Tr? S/ f

STATUTE:.f-GS&S

N

~ 9--S~&?

£<

LSI.

DESCRIPTION:

G-m

MISSPERS

&S M:

•

MALE

<p/

? £

NUMBER OF PREMISES ENTERED

E I 365P^65i •

EMPLOYER / SCHOOL:

RACE:

[""^

£L

FORCED ENTRY [

" ^££_£,

STATE: < ^ * ^

M

ASST.OFG10: ^ 7 ^ - 3

POLICE CFC.

ADDRESS: ? g~ 7 S ^ ^ /f*<^£ ^-~S

SEX.

g].

1 5 ^ YES

J*^jp

| ASANOONNSD |

ASSAULT INFO: UCR CIRCUMSTANCES:

N

»ES

ADDITIONAL CHARGES (NOT UCR REPORTABLE)

JUV. DISPOSITION:

UC # :

•

[vES [ ^ S ' O [DRUG RELATED:

HOW/WHERE ENTRY MADE:
| [

9-

\ NAMsyf^a.^ ^3=^ ^ y "

<f gj - / £-g~

( X T COMMITTED j

UCR TYPE OF WEAPON:
W j STRUCTURE OCCUPANCY:

/

ZP Z-y/jr

UC S~

I ALCOHOL RELATED: I

2~Sr {

[ATTEMPTED

C/

NON-HISPANIC

TO

HEIGHT:

TO

WEIGHT:

TO
HAIR COLOR:

~r

m
EYE COLOR:

CITED:

d

YES I I

UCR ARREST CHARGE:

STATUTE:

MISC. 1

[FEL.1

1 COUNTS:

] UCR ARREST CHARGE:

STATUTE:

MISO. 1

I F£U [

| COUNTS:

;WEsrr;v2tfXErje^^
I

UEFW&nOH

I STOLEN

.v\w.<%'v\. %<$>#,/%; '

L J RECVO

L j STLN/REC I £ J

* / ? ^ / ^ C^eS

SERIAL NUMBER:

••^U

MODEL:

MAKE:
E J PROPERTY TYPE: k y j T

VALUE:

PROPERTY DAMAGED

CITY:

STOLEN LOCATION:

STATE VEK TYPE:

VEH. DAMAGE:

[L

DEPOSITION:

IE

MODEL:

9 7 7 ^ 0 &£>

1
C

/£><?'&

STATE:

[<£?/ [

1

/

— TV*-?

S*,~,~~L<

£*.&*&£.£*

REM. NClC j

JC^iy.^:.

^ Z.- . / £

Signature:

CITATION:

OWNER NOTIFIED: [ " " " V E S

P^NO

/ J

Witness/Officer:

<*. <~ <y* <~ ^

- ^

£TVf?.f/^£r

.^??W .TTfT ^rfT

£/£:.<^*f?f?r.

ff^SrJ2

fr*.A~.

^VJF.

> £ ^ »
.^T^TTV^r..-^..

<?. f?r*. c

.?..T.<r.^7.^.. .. -^...^r-^fr:

f?r? *?L -C....

f^rr.^. - ^ . . .

S..^Z^m^f!>^r *~.sf.
/p<r&£* —rT......*.^\..../r*'.Sr.<<L ...

f'rr.f..*r
fr^ps-

* / > * . .7T^*-Of-. . *7Ar../.<R.*-*rS...

- ^ ^ ...^ ^ ^ < :

/6f ^ - 2 - / ^ ? ^ - ^ ^

.~/*"^:~* l/s.,

<£% ^ < ^ l^f' 5

AOD'L FORMS £ QUANTITY;

| NO

3 nerecYceroTymatlftave rood Ihe Ioregoing*inaM. am mo {owner^cwoBra v
agent) otthe-aoove oeaiuitjeu property a n d *>r vara c f * a n d «wr tnformaOoTt
sftowrrjstnje and cemxttotne best ot an/,bettef and knowledge:Iftarf wU{,
assistJn me prosecudon of me person or persons arrested for 1fteft of tnls.
property and or vehicle.

4:.. ?2 ~JJ*.7.<CeJ..A*x?J.
-A*3-

VALUE:

^

-<z TT^-7*^.. A£-r
^lS-£\*<.
C&*5 tc
^& f/^^<^...~.^/yS^

^

| YES |

^fl?..J77^~.hf^.^J?^

~£i4. ?&... ./?. .-?.r.?.rs%

S ^.*^A/,

SGT/JD:

COLOR: j ^ ^ - [ , / £ ^

CITY/ST/23P:
N 0

T:* ^.../f.<y...
Cjk.£.C-

VEH SUPP:

£?

NO

YEAR: , 7 g^

TIME-

DATE

ENT. N C l C r H Y E S ^ J

NARRATIVE:(Cs^c

...f.£?.

^

•

CITY/ST/2JP*

A f F n A V f T O F I H e T Secoon'To^KA FaJwsljf reporting oftens* or. accusing
subject A p o r » m » B g u ^ ^ a c l w « H i n i » d e w j » a ^ o r ^ J > « : { 1 } t o o w i n x ^ ;
flww» or cause©tooctjvontafew information to any few-ertorcsment ofTrcer
w<rt a purpose of xxsuanglfto officeFto believe mat enotner haa committed
art offense: oc (2) knowingly g*es or caoses tofiegiven Inf ormattort to any
law erfutuaner* ameer concerning m e commission of an offense* knowing
marine offense rftl not occur or icnowing tnat he has no Information relating
tains offense or Hanger* 1
, <• " ""

.../Z Sfv

£&***-£?

YES

^

^ j , „ ^ ,

RECOVERY CODE:

*/S

Q

DAMAGE/STOLEN VALUE:

j I RECOVERED LOCATION:

(&?A£&.

REM. NClC

v"***-

STOLEN LOCATION:

...Z..<?

NO |

STYLE: \C?57?\

^ / "

# - I RECOVERED BY OFFICER / ID:

0

VALUE:
STATE:

LD.: g V ^ ^ ENT.NCIC Q ] YES Q

7?\s7^

MAKE: 1 ^ ^ U?»./>*~v
UCENSE#:

DATE/TIME:
CJTY:

RECOVERED LOCATION:

VEHDESC:

STATE:

La:

OFC:

RECOVERED BY- AGENCY:

CONTROL OFFICER: /l£i~*?£'f

$T7£\

LOST

FOUND £ ] DAMAGED I Q

«>"H I

DESCRIPTION:

CASE* < %2~/2*

«~| PAGE 2 OF C I ] I

PERS:

WIT STMT
QUI.

CONT:

MERCHANT SHOPUFT FORM:
RECOROS/O:

; >

OFC ASSLT:
BLUE JUV. DOCKET:
VECC/JD:

SHORT FORM* n Y E S f t NO
TAPED NARR? [ ^ YES [""1 NO

ADDENDUM B
West Valley City Docket, No. 921002665MC, defense
exhibit 2.

D O C K E T
Defendant

Page
1
SEPTEMBER 8, 1993
4:37 PM
WVP Case: 921002665 MC
Agency No.: WVP
WEDNESDAY

THIRD CIRCUIT COURT - WVC
Citation:

C204816

City Misdemeanor
Judge:

STRADER, ROGER LEE
3878 W ROCKWOOD WAY #50
WEST VALLEY CITY
UT 84119

DEFENDANTS
[BIT -

\-m

NO OTN # FOR THIS CASE
Charges
Violation Date: 07/21/92
1. FALSE PERSONAL INFO TO P/O
Sev: MC
2. WARRANT OF ARREST FEE
Sev:

Bail
76-8-507
WARRANT FEE

100.00
70.00

Proceedings
07/22/92 Case filed on 07/22/92.
JLB
07/23/92 FILED BOND - BEEHIVE BAIL BONDS
LIB
08/04/92 ARR
scheduled for 8/ 7/92 at 9:00 A in room 3 with TEM
SLB
08/07/92 Mis Arraignment
JUDGE: MEDLEY, TYRONE E.
CAC
TAPE: 10153
COUNT:
1810
CAC
ATD: None Present
PRO: None Present
CAC
Deft is present
CAC
Deft advised of rights
CAC
PTC
scheduled for 09/03/92 at 1000 A in room 3 with TEM CAC
Chrg: 76-8-507
Plea: Not Guilty
CAC
08/14/92 FILED: NOTICE OF APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL - J SCOTT C0TTINGHAM
PAW
09/03/92 Hearing (PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE) :
JUDGE: MEDLEY, TYRONE E.
CAC
TAPE: 10227
COUNT:
1572
CAC
Deft Present
CAC
ATD: C0TTINGHAM, SCOTT
PRO: ST0NEY, KEITH
CAC
DPWC. DEF COP. DEF ADVISED OF RIGHTS - WAIVED.
CAC
Chrg: 76-8-507 Find: Guilty Plea
CAC
Chrg: FALSE I.D. TO PO
Plea: Not Guilty Find: Guilty Plea CAC
Fine Amount:
50.00
Suspended:
.00
CAC
Jail:
10 DAYS
Suspended: 10 DAYS
CAC
Fines and assessments entered: FN
37.04 CAC
SL
12.96 CAC
Total fines and assessments..:
50.00 CAC
CREATE Trust A/R # 01 Attorney Fee - City
100.00 CAC
C/O JAIL SUSPENDED ON TIMELY PAYMENT OF FINE & FEES
CAC
Began tracking Fine Stay
Review on 12/03/92 CAC
09/08/92 FILED: NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL, LARSEN, EDDINGTON &
IHR
COTTINGHAM
IHR
01/14/93 TEM/RN DEF FTP FINE. C/O BW FOR $150.00 + WR FEE.
RLN
Ended tracking of Fine Stay
RLN
Warrant ordered
RLN
Warrant printed
RLN
01/19/93 Warrant order updated
RLN

D O C K E T

Defendant
STRADER, ROGER LEE

Citation:

Page
2
SEPTEMBER 8, 1993
4:37 PM
WVP Case: 921002665 MC
Agency No.: WVP
City Misdemeanor
WEDNESDAY

THIRD CIRCUIT COURT - WVC
C204816

01/19/93 Warrant printed
BENCH WARRANT batch issued - JUDGE TEM Issued - 01/19/93
Failure to pay fine or post bail
Bail amount ordered:
150.00
Warrant fee:
70.00
Added WARRANT FEE
to charge list.
05/11/93 Warrant recalled on 05/11/93 because Booked
05/17/93 FILED BOND
$220
BEEHIVE BAIL BONDS
05/20/93 HRG
scheduled for 5/20/93 at 8:31 A in room 3 with TM
Hearing:
JUDGE: T PATRICK CASEY
TAPE: 10913
COUNT:
3323
Deft Present
ATD: None Present
PRO: None Present
REV
scheduled for 05/25/93 at 0200 P in room 3 with TM
DPWOC. ON DEF MOTION C/O CASE SET FOR REVIEW
05/25/93 Hearing (REVIEW HEARING) :
JUDGE: ROBERT W. DAINES
TAPE: 10931
COUNT:
0420
Deft Present
ATD: None Present
PRO: None Present
REV
scheduled for 07/06/93 at 0200 P in room 3 with TM
DPWC. PRELIMINARY HEARING ON ANOTHER MATTER RESET, THIS CASE
SET ON SAME CALENDAR.
07/06/93 Bench Warrant Hearing:
Bench Warrant Authorization requested by the Court
DEF FTA REVIEW C/O BW $300.00
Warrant ordered
07/07/93 Warrant printed
07/15/93 BENCH WARRANT batch issued - JUDGE TM
Issued - 07/15/93
Failure to appear for hearing
Bail amount ordered:
300.00
Warrant fee:
07/21/93 Warrant recalled on 07/21/93 because Booked
07/22/93 HRG
scheduled for 7/22/93 at 8:32 A in room 3 with TM
Hearing:
JUDGE: T. PATRICK CASEY
TAPE: 11052
COUNT:
1626
Deft Present
ATD: COTTINGHAM, J SCOTT
PRO: None Present
CUSTODY: Own Recognizance
DPWOC IN CUSTODY. C/O CTS FOR FINE, ATTY FEE IN AMOUNT OF $100
DUE 10/22/93
Began tracking Fine Stay
Review on 10/22/93

RLN
CAC
CAC
CAC
CAC
CAC
LJB
LIB
DHR
CAC
CAC
CAC
CAC
CAC
CAC
CAC
CAC
CAC
CAC
CAC
CAC
CAC
CAC
CAC
CAC
CAC
JLS
CAC
CAC
CAC
CAC
LJB
CAC
CAC
CAC
CAC
CAC
CAC
CAC
CAC
CAC

D O C K E T
Defendant

Citation:

C204816

STRADER, ROGER LEE
Accounting* Summary

Total Due
120.00

Fine Due
A/R Type:
Attorney Fee

Paid

Total Due
100.00

#01

Page
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SEPTEMBER 8, 1993
4:37 PM
WVP Case: 921002665 MC
Agency No.: WVP
City Misdemeanor
WEDNESDAY

THIRD CIRCUIT COURT - WVC

Credit

Balance
120.00

Time Pay#

Paid

Received

Balance
100.00

Additional Case Data
Sentence Summary
1. FALSE I.D. TO PO
Fine amount:
Jail: 10 DA
2. WARRANT FEE

50.00

Plea: Not Guilty
Find: Guilty Plea
Suspended:
.00
Suspended: 10 DA
Plea:
Find:

Parties
Atty for Defendant
COTTINGHAM, J SCOTT
270 HARMON BUILDING
3540 SOUTH 4000 WEST
WEST VALLY CITY
UT 84120

Home Phone: (
WorJc Phone: (

)
)

/ 01

Payee
SCOTT COTTINGHAM
Personal Description

Sex: M
DOB: 09/04/54
Dr. Lie. No.: 0
Scheduled Hearing Summary
ARRAIGNMENT
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE
HEARING
REVIEW HEARING
REVIEW HEARING
HEARING

State: UT
on
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on
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Expires:

08/07/92
09/03/92
05/20/93
05/25/93
07/06/93
07/22/93

0900
1000
0831
0200
0200
0832

Tracking Status

Fine Stay
End of the docket report for this case.

Review Date
10/22/93
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ADDENDUM C
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order (R.
51-57)

DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
RICHARD G. HAMP, Bar No. 4048
Deputy County Attorney
2001 South State Street, Room #S37Q0
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200
Telephone: (801) 468-3422

Third Judicial District

MAR 9 « 9 *
Deputy'

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSION OF LAW

Plaintiff,
-vs-

CaseNo.931901413FS

ROGERL.STRADER,

Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki

Defendant.

This matter having come before this Court pursuant to the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
and the Court having heard the arguments made by counsel, the Court now hereby makes the
following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On or about July 21, 1992 at 3390 South 3900 West Officer Randall of the West

Valley Police Department observed the defendant leaving a construction site at 11:00 p.m. with
something in his hand.
2.

Officer Randall observed the defendant enter his car with the object and drive

away. Officer Randall initiated a stop of the defendants car and requested identification from the
defendant. The defendant was unable to give the officer any identification but verbally identified
himself as Stanley Kent Strader with a date of birth of 3/1/53. A passenger in the vehicle
volunteered to obtain the defendant's identification. An individual named Tony Ochoa returned

GO

and provided the officer with a wallet which was represented as the defendant's. The wallet
contained a drivers license which had been altered. The name on the license was Earl S. Nesbitt.
3.

While the officer was talking with the defendant he noticed a saw on the back seat

of the defendant's car. The officer asked the defendant about the saw and the defendant told the
officer the defendant was picking the saw up for a friend.
4.

The defendant was placed under arrest by Officer Randall for False Identification

to a Police Officer, a Class C Misdemeanor, and the officer filled out a citation with this charge
on it.
5.

The officer ran a check on the license plate on the defendant's vehicle and it was

registered to another car. The officer determined to impound the vehicle.
6.

Officer Randall began to search the vehicle incident to the arrest of the defendant

and the impound of the vehicle. During this search the officer found several syringes in the
glove compartment of the car and a syringe which was full of a substance on the driver's side
floor. The officer called for a canine unit to finish the search of the car. The canine unit
recovered an additional syringe with liquid in it that was hidden under the seat cover of the
vehicle.
7.

The defendant was transported to the West Valley Police Department where he

was mirandized and questioned by Officer Randall. The defendant admitted that the syringe
which had been recovered from the seat of the car was his.
8.

The defendant was transported to the Salt Lake County Jail and booked into jail

for False Identification to a Police Officer, a Class C Misdemeanor; Theft, a Class A
Misdemeanor and Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Third Degree Felony.
9.

On July 22, 1992 the False Identification to a Police Officer charge was filed in

the West Valley Circuit Court.

The defendant was arraigned on August 7, 1992 and the

defendant entered a not guilty plea.

On September 3, 1992 the defendant, represented by

counsel, entered a guilty plea to this charge in West Valley Circuit Court.

The case was

prosecuted by the West Valley City Prosecutors Office.
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10.

On October 19, 1992 the charges of Theft, False Identification to a Police Officer,

and Possession of a Controlled Substance were filed by the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office.
On February 23, 1993 the defendant, represented by counsel, entered a guilty plea to an amended
charge of Attempted Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Class A Misdemeanor, and Theft, a
Class A Misdemeanor. The False Identification to a Police Officer charge was dismissed. The
defendant withdrew his guilty pleas on May 23, 1993. A preliminary hearing was held on
September 7, 1993 and the defendant was bound over to the Third District Court on the theft and
the possession charges. The false information charge was dismissed by the circuit court as
defendant had previously entered a guilty plea on that charge.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The County Attorney's Office by charging all three crimes was following rule 9.5

of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
2.

The West Valley City Prosecutors Office did not have jurisdiction over the Class

A Theft charge or the Third Degree Felony Possession of a Controlled Substance charge and
could not prosecute these charges. It did have jurisdiction over the Class C Misdemeanor False
Identification to a Police Officer charge.
3.

The defendant gave the false name to the police officer before the drugs were

discovered and before the theft had been confirmed. The defendant, by giving a false name may
have been trying to escape apprehension by the officer but this action did not have the same
criminal objective and was not related to the theft or the possession of drugs.
4.

The false identification to a police officer, theft and possession of a controlled

substance charges were not part of a single criminal episode as defined by §76-1-401, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended. There was not a single criminal objective and they are different
statutes, have different elements, would be prosecuted by different jurisdictions and have
different penalties.
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5.
The Defendants Motion to Dismiss is denied.
DATED this J ^ ^ d a y of /^^fl^e4f, 1994.
BY THE.

The Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki
Third District Court Judge

Approved as to form:

~XyJ\P^ h < / \ M A L - ^ DAVID P.S. MACK
Counsel for Defendant
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DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
RICHARD G. HAMP, Bar No. 4048
Deputy County Attorney
2001 South State Street, Room #S3700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200
Telephone: (801) 468-3422

Mitt ! « *
oev*xic*t%

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

ORDER

-vs-

CaseNo.931901413FS

ROGERL.STRADER,

Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki

Defendant.

The Court having reviewed the evidence and the law and having entered Findings of Fact
and the Conclusion of Law based thereon;
HEREBY ORDERS that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is denied.
DATED this (

day of

/ ^ f ? < ^ f r * - , 1994.
BY THE CetJRT:

The Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki
Third District Court Judge
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CgRXIFICATE OF PELTRY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and
Conclusion of Law and the Order were delivered to David P.S. Mack, counsel for Defendant
ROGER L. STRADER, by placing the contents thereof in the Salt Lake Legal Defender courier
box located within our office this /

day o f ^ l ^ ^ / ^

? , 1994.

mrr/05072
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